Kill All Humans... Bugs! Machine Learning to the rescue of code review

Presented by Philippe Arteau



Who am I?

- Philippe Arteau
- Security Researcher at GoSecure Countertack
- Open-source developer
 - Find Security Bugs (SpotBugs Static Analysis for Java)
 - Security Code Scan (Roslyn Static Analysis for .NET)
 - Burp and ZAP Plugins (Retire.js, CSP Auditor, Reissue Request Scripter, ..)
- Machine Learning Enthusiast .. not a professional





Agenda

1. Static-analysis concepts

- Symbolic execution
- False positives
- Inter-procedural data-flow
- Obstacles

- 2. Applying Machine Learning
 - Identifying attributes
 - Graph creation
 - Overview of the Machine Learning algoritms
 - Results

- 3. Demonstrations
- 4. Lessons learned (Conclusion)





Static-analysis





Symbolic execution

Simulating the code execution using expression rather than concrete data

It can be use :

- To resolve conditions
- To evaluate the states of variable as it evolves during execution



Reference : <u>Symbolic Execution for Software Testing: Three Decades Later</u>



Symbolic execution (in action)



а		b		С	С	
input1						
input1		input2				
input1		input2		in	input2*2	
	(b - 1 > 2)) ==	= true			
	а		b		С	
	input1*8 input1*8+1		input2		input2*2	
			input2		input2*2	
[(b - 1 > 2) == false					
	а		b		С	
input1+44 input1+45			input2		input2*2	
			input2		input2*2	



0-

Symbolic execution

 Symbolic execution mainly focuses on resolving input values to reach a specific path

 Many vulnerabilities analyzers need to monitor validation state of variables.





Taint analysis

Safe

a = "userId = "
b = Config.ADMIN_USER_ID
c = a + b

Unsafe

a = "userId = "

b = getHttpParameter("uid")
c = a + b

User.applyFilter(c)

User.applyFilter(c)





Taint analysis (in action)

Taint analysis as implemented in Find Security Bugs



а	b	C
CONSTANT		
CONSTANT	TAINTED	
CONSTANT	TAINTED	TAINTED



{\mathcal{H}} Find Security Bugs







Obstacles





Obstacles that static analyzers must consider:



Reflection



Dependency injection



Second order vulnerability



Encapsulation



Custom framework and utility



Two blind spots from FSB

1. Implements Inter-procedural data flow

But..

- Inter-procedural data flow can missed some cases
 - See : Reflection, Incomplete code, DI, Second Order, etc.
- Inter-procedural data flow can identify exploitable path from source to sink
- 2. <u>Proprietary</u> framework and utility functions are not taken into account by Find Security Bugs





Objective :

Prioritize new vulnerabilities based on previously classified bug patterns







Applying Machine Learning





"Machine learning is a field of computer science that uses **statistical techniques** to give computer systems the ability to "learn" with data, without being **explicitly programmed**."



<u>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine_learning</u>



Supervised vs Unsupervised





Supervised classification vs regression

Supervised classification

Attempt to predict the **right answer** from a discrete number of possibilities

Prediction Features ->

- Recommend or not to user (binary)
- Type of species (finite list)

Supervised regression

Attempt to predict a **continuous value**

Prediction Features ->

- House pricing (10k to 10M)
- Time of recovery from incident



Algorithm?



http://www.r2d3.us/visual-intro-to-machine-learning-part-1/



Identifying Attributes

Visualization of the data is crucial

Some bug types do not have false positive (on the Juliet Test Suite)

	XSS_SERVLET		
	XPATH_INJECTION		03253333200324333
	WEAK_MESSAGE_DIGEST_SHA1	- 608 @ @ % @	
	WEAK_MESSAGE_DIGEST_MDS	- କ୍ରିତ ସ୍ଥିନ୍ଦ୍ର ବ୍ରତ୍ତ ବ୍ରତ	
	UNVALIDATED_REDIRECT		CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR
	UNENCRYPTED_SOCKET		
	UNENCRYPTED_SERVER_SOCKET		
	STATIC_IV	ା-୦୦୦୦ ଦେ ବେନ୍ଦ୍ର	
	SQL_INJECTION_JDBC		
a	PT_RELATIVE_PATH_TRAVERSAL	- and and a co a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	
dVD	PT_ABSOLUTE_PATH_TRAVERSAL	- @ @ @ 0 0 @ 0	
B	PREDICTABLE_RANDOM	- 80800 00 00 000000	
	LDAP_INJECTION	- 60,000,000,000,000	
	INFORMATION_EXPOSURE_THROUGH_AN_ERROR_MESSAGE	=O	
	HTTP_RESPONSE_SPLITTING		
	HARD_CODE_PASSWORD	- දෙපිළුක දැමුන්තිල ඉතුළු	
	HARD_CODE_KEY	- 00 ⁰ 00 00 00	
	ECB_MODE	- අදුක ංගු කිලේ ක ඉතින	ක්ෂුක්තුව කියා අතුක්ෂුව
	DMI_CONSTANT_DB_PASSWORD	°000000 0000000000000000000000000	
	DES_USAGE	E (1900 00 (1990) (1900 000)	
	COMMAND_INJECTION	- (2000)000000000000000000000000000000000	
		BAD	GOOD



Identifying Attributes

Visualization of the data is crucial

Some bug types do not have false positive (on the Juliet Test Suite)

	XSS_SERVLET		
	XPATH_INJECTION	- 2520522502023	6692636963696369636
	WEAK_MESSAGE_DIGEST_SHA1	- පිංහි ඕ ඉංගිං ම	
	WEAK_MESSAGE_DIGEST_MD5	- କ୍ରିତ ବ୍ରହ୍ମ ବ୍ରତ	
	UNVALIDATED_REDIRECT		(PSO) SO
	UNENCRYPTED_SOCKET		
	UNENCRYPTED_SERVER_SOCKET	- 963333639963368	
	STATIC_IV	- ୦ ଡ ଡ ଡ ଡ ଡି ସେହ	
L	SQL_INJECTION_JDBC		27639,6316,2016,2016,2016,2016,2016,2016,2016,20
u l	PT_RELATIVE_PATH_TRAVERSAL	- 0000 00 00 00 00	
d 4 i fir	PT_ABSOLUTE_PATH_TRAVERSAL	- @ @ @ O O @ O	
ō	PREDICTABLE_RANDOM	- 80808 0 0 0 0 000800	
	LDAP_INJECTION		
INFORMAT	ION_EXPOSURE_THROUGH_AN_ERROR_MESSAGE	- 0	
Γ	HTTP_RESPONSE_SPLITTING	- (20) = 100° (0,3° (0,10) (0,10) (0,10) (0,10)	CONTRACTOR OF THE OWNER OWNER OWNER OWNER OWNER
	HARD_CODE_PASSWORD	- යැළිළුක යුඹුහතිමුකමුණු	
_	HARD_CODE_KEY	ବେଣ୍ଣ ଦେ <mark>ଚ</mark> ଜ୍ଚ	
	ECB_MODE	- අත රෙනි කරන්න	ලැබෙලේ ඉතාල දැක්වර්ග හර දැක්වර්ග ද දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර්ග දැක්වර ද ද දැක්වර්ග දැක
	DMI_CONSTANT_DB_PASSWORD	°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°°	
_	DES_USAGE	- ලබා ගම් ලම් ලම	
	COMMAND_INJECTION		
	2	BAD	GOOD



Identifying attributes

- Quality attributes are key
- Our attribute are based on contextual information that a human would use





New attributes created (part 1)

Extracting the signature of the source

- ProprietaryEncoder.encodeHTML(String)
- RequestWrapper.getParameter(String)
- Configuration.getParameter(String)

- Extracting the signature of the sink
 - Statement.executeUpdate(String)
 - File(String)





New attributes created (part 2)

Extracting the state of sources

- Does the injectable parameter is affected by one safe source
- [...] by one tainted source
- [...] by one unknown source
- Additional localization attributes
 - Filename
 - Module name





Modelizing inter-procedural dataflow







Graph representation

\$ MATCH (source:Variable)-[t:TRANSFER*0..8]->(n:Variable{name:"javax/servlet/http/HttpServletResponse.addHeader(Ljava/lang/String;Ljava/lang/St...



In order to do taint analysis accross the entire web application, a graph was built





MATCH (source:Variable)-[r1:TRANSFER*0..8]-> (node:Variable)-[r:TRANSFER]->(sink:Variable)

WHERE

- source.state IN ["UNKNOWN", "SAFE", "TAINTED"] AND
- sink.name = _sink_** AND
- node.source = _source_**
- **RETURN** source, sink, r1, node, r;

** Full method signature (including parameter index)





{fit Find Security Bugs Sonarqube

Vulnerabilities prioritization







GOSECURE

GOOD



BAD

kNN

Results (Spring Framework)

	Recall	Precision	F-Measure	Accuracy
Naïve Bayes	0.761	1.00	0.614	72.7 %
K-NN (k=2)	0.973	0.966	0.970	94.2 %
C4.5	1.00	0.955	0.977	95.5 %
Random Forest	1.00	0.964	0.982	96.4 %
SVM	1.00	0.955	0.977	95.5 %
TP + TN			CN	



TP+TN+FP+FN



Lessons learned





Important of attributes

- Quality attributes are more important than the choice of ML algorithms
- Training set need to be close to the test set
 - Method signature attributes don't work well when comparing two differents librairies
- Machine Learning benefits mainly large codebase (1000+ vulnerabilities)
 - Analysis of most web application, frameworks or libraries can be done in few hours
- Aggregating datasets from various librairies did not work well



Future for FindSecBugs and ML.

At the moment, still consider experimental

- Improving FSB from the statistical analysis
 - Detect bug type that have a very high false positive rate
 - Detect source method that have a very high false positive rate
 - Suggest addition of encoding method
 - Detect sink method that have a very high false positive rate
 - Improve the heuristic of the detector





Introduction to ML with Orange

- Hand-on introduction
- Step-by-step exercises
- Supervised learning using
 - Titanic Dataset
 - Static-Analysis Dataset (taken from the project presented today)
- When: September 13th (Tomorrow)









Questions?



- parteau@gosecure.ca
- gosecure.net/blog/
- @h3xStream @GoSecure_Inc





References





Machine Learning Coursera

https://www.coursera.org/learn/machine-learning

Introduction to Machine Learning

https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/mlintro





References Code Graph and Symbolic Execution

- Symbolic Execution for Software Testing: Three Decades Later by Cristian Cadar and Koushik Sen: <u>https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse484/14au/reading/sy</u> mbolic-execution-testing.pdf
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- Modeling and Discovering Vulnerabilities with Code Property Graphs : <u>http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ielx7/6954656/6956545/06956589.pdf</u>



