

# Static-Analysis

Now you're playing with power!

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# Agenda

- Definitions
- Motivation
- Different levels of sophistication
- Internals and applications
  - AST based analyzer
  - Taint analysis
  - Continuous integration
  - Automate code refactoring
- Additional considerations
- Expect multiple demos !



# Who Am I?

- Philippe Arteau
- Security Researcher at GoSecure
- Open-source developer
  - Find Security Bugs (SpotBugs - Static Analysis for Java)
  - Security Guard (Roslyn – Static Analysis for .NET)
  - Burp and ZAP Plugins (Retire.js, CSP Auditor)
- Volunteer for the **nsec** conference and former trainer



# Definition



# Definition

Static Analysis is

- “The analysis of computer software that is performed **without actually executing** programs”

In the context of this presentation

- Finding **vulnerabilities** by looking at the **code**  
(with the help of tools)





Motivation..


**Why should you use it?**



# Motivation


Why would I use Static Analysis?

- High coverage of the **application code**
- Quick discovery in the development lifecycle
- Identification of the source of the problem not just the symptoms




# Limitations

- Low coverage of **the infrastructure code**
- False positives
  - Exploitability is always an estimate
- Many vulnerability classes are not covered
  - Misconfigurations
  - CSRF vulnerabilities
  - Logic flaws





# **Different levels of sophistication**






# Techniques

| Techniques                          | Description / Behavior   |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| Pattern Matching                    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Analog to grep</li></ul>   |
| Abstract Syntax Tree                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Parsing of the code base</li><li>• Inline heuristic</li></ul>    |
| Data-Flow Analysis                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Simulation of the execution</li><li>• Tainted analysis</li></ul> |
| Inter-procedural Data-Flow Analysis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Taint tracking across function (procedure)</li></ul>             |



# Techniques overview







# **Abstract Syntax Tree Based Analyzer**



# Demonstration Bandit



- <https://github.com/openstack/bandit>

**DEMO**





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# Abstract Syntax Tree

## Definition

Tree representation of the abstract syntactic structure of the source code




# Abstract Syntax Tree

Abstract Syntax Tree main features:

- Handling of spacing and nested method calls
  - Take away the complexity regex to handle spaces, indentation, new lines, etc.
- Resolution of types (optional – depends of the language)
  - Allow matching of the class name **not just method**
- Possibility to do some heuristic on the inline value
  - This means less false positives




# Abstract Syntax Tree



Roslyn AST : <https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/dn904670.aspx>


# Basic AST Analysis

```
var rsa = new RSACryptoServiceProvider(1024);
```





# **Symbolic Execution and Taint Analysis**





```
def quiz(int a, int b) {  
    c = a*6  
    if(c + b < 50) {  
        if(a-40 == b) {  
            if(a + b > 0) {  
                //How to get here?  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}
```

How can we find values need to a reach specific path?  
(programmatically)


## Symbolic execution



## Symbolic execution


Simulating the code execution using expression rather than concrete data

To determine how to reach specific code location, conditions must be transformed in mathematical equation.



Reference : [Symbolic Execution for Software Testing: Three Decades Later](#)

# Symbolic in action



| a      | b      | c        |
|--------|--------|----------|
| input1 |        |          |
| input1 | input2 |          |
| input1 | input2 | input2*2 |

`(b - 1 > 2) == true`

| a          | b      | c        |
|------------|--------|----------|
| input1*8   | input2 | input2*2 |
| input1*8+1 | input2 | input2*2 |

`(b - 1 > 2) == false`

| a         | b      | c        |
|-----------|--------|----------|
| input1+44 | input2 | input2*2 |
| input1+45 | input2 | input2*2 |





Symbolic execution mainly focuses on resolving **input values** to reach a **specific path**

Many vulnerabilities analyzers need to monitor **validation state** of variables. One additional concept is needed...

Taint analysis

# False Positive vs Real Positive

## ■ Safe

```
a = "userId = "
```

```
b = "1"
```

```
c = a + b
```

```
User.applyFilter(c)
```

## ■ Unsafe

```
a = "userId = "
```

```
b = getHttpParameter("uid")
```

```
c = a + b
```


```
User.applyFilter(c)
```

How to avoid reporting an issue for the left code sample?



# Taint analysis in Find Security Bugs

## Pseudo-code evaluate



## State of symbolic variables

| a        | b       | c       |
|----------|---------|---------|
| CONSTANT |         |         |
| CONSTANT | TAINTED |         |
| CONSTANT | TAINTED | TAINTED |

# Taint analysis in Find Security Bugs

Base state

- **Tainted** : Unsafe user input
- **Unknown** : Value from unknown source. It could be coming from user input
- **Safe** : Dynamic value from a safe source
- **Constant** : Hardcoded value

Context specific state (tags):

- XSS Safe, SQL Safe, XML Safe, URL Safe, etc.



# Demo Android APK analysis

- Tools available



dex2jar

{} Find Security Bugs

**DEMO**



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# Obstacles of Symbolic Execution

```
class Sample {  
    def sql = new Sql(datasource)  
  
    def getUserId(int userId) {  
        return getUserId(userId)  
    }  
  
    def getUserId(String userId) {  
        return sql.execute("SELECT * FROM Users WHERE uid="+userId)  
    }  
}
```

Is this code vulnerable?



What if getUserId() is called elsewhere?



# More Obstacles

Other obstacles that static analyzers must consider:



Reflection



Dependency injection



Second order vulnerability



Encapsulation



# Continuous Integration





# Brakeman CLI

Before continuing .. Here's a new tool that analyze Ruby applications.

Brakeman

- Target mainly Rails API
- 67 rules and growing
- <https://brakemanscanner.org/>



**DEMO**



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# Continuous integration

Continuous Integration (CI):

- The practice of merging all developer working copies to a shared mainline several times a day.
- The most basic form will include compiling the application
  - Additional tasks such as running tests and code analysis can be added
- Most static-analysis tool integrate with Continuous integration



# Deployment strategy




- Usually implemented in this order.
- One deployment does not replace another

# Continuous integration in action

- Demonstration with Brakeman ran from a Jenkins instance
- Job configuration
  - Brakeman command
  - Post Build Jenkins Plugin

**DEMO**



**Jenkins**



# Continuous integration : Jenkins + Docker

- How easy can it be to deployed ?

## Dockerfile


```
FROM jenkins/jenkins:lts  
  
USER root  
RUN apt-get update &&  
    apt-get install -y ruby rubygems &&  
    gem install brakeman  
USER jenkins
```

Customize the package available  
from Jenkins Jobs

## docker-compose.yml

```
version: '2'  
services:  
  jenkins:  
    build: .  
    ports:  
      - 8080:8080  
    volumes:  
      - ./jenkins_home:/var/jenkins_home
```

Mount main Jenkins folder for easy  
backup and migration





# **Automate code refactoring**



# Automate code refactoring

- Identifying bugs and vulnerabilities is nice but...

0 references | Philippe Arteau, 3 days ago | 1 author, 1 change

```
public class HomeController : Controller
```

```
{
```

0 references | 0 changes | 0 authors, 0 changes | 0 requests | 0 exceptions

```
public ActionResult Index(string input)
```

```
{
```

```
    if (input == "") {
```

```
        return View();
```

```
    }
```

Error List


Entire Solution | 0 Errors | 36 Warnings | 0 Messages | Build + IntelliSense

| Code   | Description  |
|--------|--|
| CA1820 | Replace the call to 'string.operator ==(string, string)' in 'HomeController.Index(string)' with a call to 'String.IsNullOrEmpty'.  |
| CA2210 | Sign 'DemoDevTeach.dll' with a strong name key.  |
|        | The 'packages' element is not declared.  |
| CA1822 | The 'this' parameter (or 'Me' in Visual Basic) of 'CookieSample.createCookie()' is never used. Mark the member as static (or Shared in Visual Basic) or at least one property accessor, if appropriate.        |
| CA1822 | The 'this' parameter (or 'Me' in Visual Basic) of 'HardcodePassword.test(string)' is never used. Mark the member as static (or Shared in Visual Basic) or at least one property accessor, if appropriate.      |
| CA1822 | The 'this' parameter (or 'Me' in Visual Basic) of 'MvcApplication.Application_Start()' is never used. Mark the member as static (or Shared in Visual Basic) or at least one property accessor, if appropriate. |
| SG0009 | The cookie is missing security flag HttpOnly   |
| SG0008 | The cookie is missing security flag Secure   |

Code Metrics Results | CodeLens | Error List | Command Window | Output

# Automate code refactoring

- Providing fix is even better!



- Some vulnerabilities require high-level understanding of the application.



# **Additional considerations**



# How to evaluate tools?

- [WASC Static-Analysis Technologies Evaluation Criteria](#)

## Samples

- [Juliet Test Suite](#) (Java and C++)
- [OWASP Benchmark](#) (Java)
- Used vulnerable applications
  - [OWASP Vulnerable Web Applications Directory Project](#)
  - See Juliet Test Suite Page
- Make your own vulnerable samples
  - Required good security expertise





# Building your own tools

- Do not reinvent the wheel
  - Reuse existing static analysis tools (if available)
  - Search for more than one tool for comparison
  - Reuse existing lexer/parser libraries
- Thinking about the maintenance of your custom rules
  - Do you have the time to maintain those?
  - Will your colleague be able to troubleshoot them?



# Questions ?

## Contact

✉ [parteau@gosecure.ca](mailto:parteau@gosecure.ca)  
🌐 [gosecure.net/blog/](http://gosecure.net/blog/)  
🐦 @h3xStream @GoSecure\_Inc



# References





# Tools Presented

- [Openstack Bandit](#) (Python)
- [Brakeman](#) (Ruby)
- [Find Security Bugs](#) (Java, Scala, Groovy)
- [.NET Security Guard](#) (C# and VB.net)





# Useful resources

- NIST SAMATE Project :
  - [Source Code Security Analyzers](#)
  - [Byte Code Scanners](#)

## Books

- Brian Chess et Jacob West, **Secure Programming with Static Analysis**, 2007, Addison-Wesley
- Gary McGraw, **Software Security: Building Security In**, 2006, Addison-Wesley



# Samples for Tools evaluation

## Samples

- Juliet Test Suite (Java and C++)
  - <https://samate.nist.gov/SRD/testsuite.php>
- OWASP Benchmark
  - <https://github.com/OWASP/benchmark>
- Used vulnerable applications
  - [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_Vulnerable\\_Web\\_Applications\\_Directory\\_Project#tab=Off-Line\\_apps](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Vulnerable_Web_Applications_Directory_Project#tab=Off-Line_apps)

## Criteria

- [WASC Static-Analysis Technologies Evaluation Criteria](#)